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Abstract
In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learn-
ing, and revision of one’s beliefs in response to conditional information such
as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.
1 Introduction
Stanford (2006) illustrates the importance of the capacity to learn new concepts
with case studies from the history of science. Hintikka (1970: 135) calls formal
philosophy’s inability to model logical learning “a scandal of deduction.” Van
Fraassen (1981)’s “Judy Benjamin problem” highlights how difficult it is to model
the learning of conditional information such as indicative conditionals that, unlike
material conditionals, do not express propositions. This brief note shows that these
three problems are easily dealt with in Spohn (1988; 2012)’s theory of ranking
functions. I will sketch the latter theory in section 2, deal with conceptual change
and logical learning in section 3, and conditional information in section 4.
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2 Ranking functions
Ranking functions have been introduced by Spohn (1988; 2012) in order to model
qualitative conditional belief. The theory is quantitative or numerical in the sense
that ranking functions assign numbers to propositions, which are the objects of
belief in this theory. These numbers are needed for the definition of conditional
ranking functions representing conditional beliefs. As we will see, though, once
conditional ranking functions are defined we can interpret everything in purely
qualitative, but conditional terms.
Consider a set of possible worlds W and an algebra of propositionsA over W.
A function % : A→N∪ {∞} fromA into the set of natural numbersN extended
by∞,N ∪ {∞}, is a finitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking function
onA just in case for all finite / countable / arbitrary sets of propositions B ⊆ A:
% (W) = 0 (1)
% (∅) = ∞ (2)
%
(⋃
B
)
= min
{
% (A) : A ∈ B} (3)
For a non-empty or consistent proposition A , ∅ fromA the conditional ranking
function % (· | A) : A\{∅} →N∪{∞} based on the unconditional ranking function
% (·) : A→N ∪ {∞} is defined as
% (· | A) =
{
% (· ∩ A) − % (A) , if % (A) < ∞,
∞ or 0, if % (A) = ∞.
Goldszmidt & Pearl (1996: 63) suggest ∞. Huber (2006: 464) suggests 0 and
stipulates % (∅ | A) = ∞ to ensure that every conditional ranking function is a
ranking function onA.
A ranking function % is regular if and only if
% (A) < % (∅) (4)
for all non-empty or consistent propositions A fromA. In contrast to probability
theory it is always possible to define a regular ranking function, no matter how
rich or fine-grained the underlying algebra of propositions.
Doxastically ranks are interpreted as grades of disbelief. A proposition A is
disbelieved just in case A is assigned a positive rank, % (A) > 0. A is believed just
in case its negation is disbelieved, %
(
A
)
> 0.
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A proposition A is disbelieved conditional on a proposition C just in case A is
assigned a positive rank conditional on C, % (A | C) > 0. A is believed conditional
on C just in case its negation is disbelieved conditional on C, %
(
A | C
)
> 0.
It takes getting used to reading positive numbers in this “negative” way, but
mathematically this is the simplest formulation of ranking theory. Note that a
proposition A is believed just in case A is believed conditional on the tautological
proposition W. This is so, because %
(
A
)
= %
(
A |W
)
.
It follows from the definition of conditional ranks that the ideal doxastic agent
should not disbelieve a non-empty or consistent proposition A conditional on it-
self: % (A | A) = % (A ∩ A) − % (A) = 0. I’ll refer to this consequence below. In
doxastic terms the first axiom says that the ideal doxastic agent should not dis-
believe the tautological proposition W. The second axiom says that she should
disbelieve the empty or contradictory proposition ∅ with maximal strength∞.
Given the definition of conditional ranks, the second axiom can be read in
purely qualitative, but conditional terms. Read this way it says that the ideal dox-
astic agent should disbelieve the empty or contradictory proposition conditional
on any proposition with a finite rank. This implies that she should believe the
tautological proposition with maximal strength, or conditional on any proposition
with a finite rank.
Finite minimitivity is the weakest version of the third axiom. It states that
% (A ∪ B) = min {% (A) , % (B)} for any two propositions A and B. Part of what
finite minimitivity says is that the ideal doxastic agent should disbelieve a dis-
junction A ∪ B just in case she disbelieves both its disjuncts A and B. Given
the definition of conditional ranks, finite minimitivity extends this requirement to
conditional beliefs. As noted above the definition of conditional ranks implies
that the ideal doxastic agent should not disbelieve a proposition conditional on
itself. Given this consequence, finite minimitivity says – in purely qualitative, but
conditional terms – the following: the ideal doxastic agent should conditionally
disbelieve a disjunction A ∪ B just in case she conditionally disbelieves both its
disjuncts A and B. Countable and complete minimitivity extend this requirement
to disjunctions of countably and arbitrarily many disjuncts, respectively.
Interpreted doxastically these axioms are synchronic norms for organizing the
ideal doxastic agent’s beliefs and conditional beliefs at a given moment in time.
They are supplemented by diachronic norms for updating her beliefs over time if
new information of various formats is received. The first update rule is defined
for the case where the new information comes in form a “certainty”, a proposition
that the ideal doxastic agent comes to believe with maximal strength.
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Update Rule 1 (Plain Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If % (·) : A→N∪{∞}
is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′ she
becomes certain of E ∈ A and no logically stronger proposition (in the sense that
E is the logically strongest proposition whose negation is assigned∞ as new rank
at t′), and her ranks are not directly affected in any other way such as forgetting
etc., then her ranking function at time t′ should be %E (·) : A→N∪ {∞}, %E (·) =
% (· | E), where for all non-empty or consistent A ∈ A:
%E (A) = % (A ∩ E) − % (E) and % (∅ | E) = ∞.
Plain conditionalization mirrors the update rule of strict conditionalization from
probability theory (Vineberg 2000). The second update rule is defined for the case
where the new information comes in form of new ranks for the elements of an
“evidential partition.” It mirrors the update rule of Jeffrey conditionalization from
probability theory (Jeffrey 1983).
Update Rule 2 (Spohn Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If % (·) : A → N ∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′
her ranks on the evidential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I} change to ni ∈N∪ {∞} with
min {ni : i ∈ I} = 0, and ni = ∞ if % (Ei) = ∞, and her finite ranks change on
no finer partition, and her ranks are not directly affected in any other way such
as forgetting etc., then her ranking function at time t′ should be %Ei→ni (·) : A →
N ∪ {∞},
%Ei→ni (·) = min
{
% (· | Ei) + ni : i ∈ I} .
Here and below I is an arbitrary index set. The third update rule is defined for the
case where the new information reports the differences between the old and the
new ranks for the elements of an evidential partition. It mirrors the update rule of
Field conditionalization from probability theory (Field 1978).
Update Rule 3 (Shenoy Conditionalization, Shenoy 1991) If % (·) : A → N ∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and
t′ her ranks on the evidential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I} change by zi ∈ N, where
min {zi : i ∈ I} = 0, and her finite ranks change on no finer partition, and her
ranks are not directly affected in any other way such as forgetting etc., then her
ranking function at time t′ should be %Ei↑zi (·) : A→N ∪ {∞},
%Ei↑zi (·) = min
{
% (· ∩ Ei) + zi −m : i ∈ I} , m = min {zi + % (Ei) : i ∈ I} .
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Spohn conditionalizing E and E to 0 and n, respectively, keeps the relative posi-
tions of all possible worlds in E and all possible worlds in E fixed. It improves
the rank of E to 0 (remember that low numbers represent low grades of disbelief),
and it changes the rank of E to n. Shenoy conditionalizing E and E by 0 and n,
respectively, improves the possibilities within E by n, as compared to the possi-
bilities in E. m is a normalization parameter. It ensures that at least one possible
world is assigned rank 0 so that the result is a ranking function.
In the case of Spohn and Shenoy conditionalization the new information con-
sists of a partition of “evidential propositions” together with a list of numbers for
these evidential propositions. The evidential propositions are those which are di-
rectly affected by experience. They are paired with numbers, which reflects the
fact that the quality of new information varies with the reliability of its source:
it makes a difference if the weather forecast predicts that it will rain, if a friend
the ideal doxastic agent trusts tells her so, or if she sees herself that it is raining.
In each case the evidential proposition the ideal doxastic agent learns is that it is
raining, and its negation is the only other cell or element of the evidential par-
tition. However, the effect the new information should have on her beliefs will
be a different one in each case. The difference in the reliability of the sources of
the new information – the weather forecast, a friend, her vision – is reflected in
the numbers that are paired with the evidential propositions. The effect the new
information should have on the ideal doxastic agent’s beliefs depends on these
numbers.
The package consisting of the synchronic norms (1-3) and the diachronic
norms (Update Rules 1-3) can be justified by the consistency argument (Huber
2007) in much the same way that probability theory can be justified by the Dutch
book argument. The consistency argument shows that obeying the synchronic and
diachronic rules of ranking theory is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining
the cognitive end of always holding beliefs that are jointly consistent and deduc-
tively closed. To the extent that the ideal doxastic agent has this goal, she should
obey the norms of ranking theory. It is not that we are telling her what and how
to believe. She is the one who has this goal. We merely point out the objectively
obtaining means-end relationships. Of course, if the ideal doxastic agent does not
aim at always holding beliefs that are jointly consistent and deductively closed,
our response will cut no ice. But that is besides the point: it is mistaking a hy-
pothetical imperative for a categorical imperative. Alternatively one may use the
representation result by Hild & Spohn (2008), or the rank-theoretic decision the-
ory by Giang & Shenoy (2000), to obtain a justification of ranking theory that is
deontological in spirit.
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3 Conceptual change and logical learning
Plain, Spohn, and Shenoy conditionalization handle belief revision when the new
information the ideal doxastic agent receives takes the form of propositions to-
gether with numbers. In the case of plain conditionalization this number is ∞,
indicating that the proposition is learned with certainty. In the case of Spohn con-
ditionalization the new information comes in the form of new grades of disbelief
for the propositions in the evidential partition. In the case of Shenoy conditional-
ization the new information comes in the form of differences between the old and
new grades of disbelief for the propositions in the evidential partition.
In addition there are at least three other forms in which an ideal doxastic agent
can receive new information: she can learn a new concept without learning any
factual information; she can learn about the logical relations between various con-
cepts, and I will treat such logical learning as a special case of conceptual learning;
and she can learn an indicative conditional that, unlike a material conditional, does
not express a (conditional or other) proposition.
In the case of a conceptual change the ideal doxastic agent learns that her
language or algebra was too poor or coarse-grained. For instance, Sophia may
start out with a language that allows her to distinguish between red wine and white
wine, and then may acquire the concept of rosé. Or she may learn that among
these wines one can distinguish between barriques and non-barriques. When the
ideal doxastic agent receives such conceptual information she should perform a
conceptual change. As we will see below, logical learning can be viewed as a
prominent special case of a conceptual change.
In many instances when we ordinary doxastic agents learn a new concept, we
do not merely learn the concept without any factual information, but we learn
the concept together with a host of other things that are not purely conceptual.
For instance, someone who learns that one can distinguish between barriques and
non-barriques usually also learns that barriques tend to be red wines. The update
rule I will propose below only deals with the clinically clean case where the new
information is purely conceptual. This is no restriction, though, as the additional
factual information that often accompanies a conceptual change can be dealt with
in a separate step by plain, Spohn, or Shenoy conditionalization. Phenomenolog-
ically the two changes may appear to be one, but for the purpose of constructive
theorizing it is best to separate them.
As a preparatory step, note that in probability theory there is no such thing as
an unbiased assignment of probabilities, an ur- or tabula rasa prior, as we may call
it. This is so even if we consider just a finite set of (more than two) possibilities.
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For instance, it is sometimes said that assigning a probability of 1/6 to each
of the six outcomes of a throw of a die is such an unbiased assignment. To see
that this is not so it suffices to note that it follows from this assignment that the
proposition that the number of spots the die will show after being thrown is greater
than one is five times the probability of its negation. More generally, for every
probability measure Pr on the power-set of {1, . . . , 6} there exists a contingent
proposition A such that Pr (A) > Pr
(
A
)
, where a proposition is contingent just
in case both it and its complement are non-empty. This is the sense in which
there is no genuinely unbiased ur- or tabula rasa prior probability measure. It
highlights the fact that, in probability theory, the tendency that is represented by
a probability measure is inseparably tied to the underlying space of possibilities,
a fact employed by Betrand (1889) in his famous paradoxes. The meaning of
probability depends on what the other options are, so to speak. To speak of the
probability of something without relativizing, or contrasting, it to all the other
options is, strictly speaking, meaningless.
In ranking theory the tabula rasa prior is that function R : A → N ∪ {∞}
such that R (A) = 0 for all non-empty propositions A in A, no matter how rich
the field or algebra of propositions A. R suspends judgment with respect to ev-
ery contingent proposition and only believes the tautology, and disbelieves the
contradiction. This tabula rasa prior ranking function turns out to be very useful.
In probability theory we cannot adequately model conceptual changes, espe-
cially those that are due the ideal doxastic agent’s not being logically omniscient.
Prior to learning a new concept Sophia’s friend Bay is equipped with a prob-
ability measure Pr on some algebra of propositions A over some set of possi-
bilities W. When Bay learns a new concept, the possibilities w in W become
more fine grained. For instance, Bay’s set of oenological possibilities with re-
gard to a particular bottle of wine prior to learning the concept of barrique may
be W1 = {red,white}. After learning this concept her set of possibilities could1
be W2 = {red & barr., red &¬ barr.,white & barr.,white &¬ barr.}. To model this
conceptual change adequately, the new algebra of propositions over W2 will con-
tain a unique counterpart-proposition for each proposition in the old algebra of
propositions over W1. In our example the algebras are the power-sets. The
unique counterpart-proposition of the old proposition that the bottle of wine is
red, {red} ⊆W1, is {red & barr., red &¬ barr.} ⊆W2.
1Here I assume Bay to be logically omniscient. Suppose she is not, and is unaware that
barr. &¬ barr. is inconsistent. Then her set of possibilities may include red & barr. &¬ barr. Her
new doxastic attitude towards the latter will be her old doxastic attitude towards red.
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The important feature of the purely conceptual part of this learning episode is
that Bay does not learn anything about which of the possibilities is the actual one.
If Sophia is the one who undergoes this conceptual change, and R1 is her ranking
function on the power-set of W1, we want her R2 to be such that R1 (A) = R2 (A′)
for each old proposition A in the power-set of W1 and its counterpart proposition
A′ in the power-set of W2. We also want her R2 to be such that R2 (B) = R2
(
B
)
for each contingent new proposition B. This is easily achieved by letting R2 copy
R1 on the counterpart-propositions of the old propositions, and by letting it copy
the tabula rasa prior on all new propositions. For Bay there is no way to obtain
probability measures Pr1 on the old algebra and Pr2 on the new algebra that are
related in this way.
The same is true for the different conceptual change that occurs when Sophia
learns the concept of rosé, and thus that her old set of possibilities was not ex-
haustive. If R1 is Sophia’s ranking function on the power-set of W1, her R3 on
the power-set of W3 = {red, rosé,white} is that function R3 such that R1 ({w}) =
R3 ({w}) for each old singleton-proposition {w}, and R3 ({w′}) = 0 for each new
singleton-proposition {w′}. For Sophia’s friend Bay there is no way to undergo
this conceptual change, since the only new probability measure that, in this sense,
conservatively extends the old one assigns 0 to the union of all new possibilities.2
Arntzenius (2003) relies on just this inability of Bay to cope with changes of the
underlying set of possibilities when he uses “spreading” to argue against strict
conditionalization and van Fraassen (1984; 1995)’s principle of “reflection.”
Before turning to the special case of logical learning let me officially state3
Update Rule 4 (Conceptual Conditionalization) Suppose % (·) : ℘ (W)→N ∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′
her algebra of propositions ℘ (W) over W explodes in the sense that W expands
to W∗, where for each w ∈ W there is at least one w∗ ∈ W∗ such that w∗ is at
least as specific as w. Each such w∗ ∈ W∗ is called a refinement of w ∈ W. This
includes explosions where W expands to some superset W∗.
Suppose further that the ideal doxastic agent’s set of possibilities W and her
ranks on the algebra of propositions ℘ (W) over W are not directly affected in any
other way such as forgetting etc.
2Readers will have noticed that one sentence may pick out different propositions with respect
to the two sets of possibilities. For instance, with respect to W1 the sentence ‘It is not a bottle of
red wine’ picks out the proposition that it is a bottle of white wine, {white}, while with respect to
W2 this sentence picks out the proposition that it is a bottle of rosé or white wine, {rosé,white}.
3To avoid complications discussed in Huber (2006) I assume the algebra of propositions to be
the power-set ℘ (W) over the set of possibilities W so that % ({w}) is defined for each w ∈W.
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Then her algebra of propositions at time t′ should be ℘ (W∗), and her ranking
function at time t′ should be %′ ({w∗}) = % ({w}) for each refinement w∗ ∈ W∗ of
some w ∈ W, and %′ ({w∗}) = 0 for each w∗ ∈ W∗ that is not a refinement of some
w ∈W.
If the ideal doxastic agent’s algebra of propositions ℘ (W) over W implodes in
the sense that W shrinks to some subset W−, then her algebra of propositions at
time t′ should be ℘ (W), and her ranking function at time t′ should be %′ ({w}) =
% ({w}) for each w ∈W− and %′ ({w−}) = ∞ for each w− ∈W \W−.
Implosions are dealt with in the same way as factual information is handled by
the update rules from the previous section. In particular, implosions do not have
to come in the form of certainties, where the possibilities w− ∈ W \W− are sent
to∞, but can come in the gradual form that Spohn and Shenoy conditionalization
deal with. In this case they are sent to some finite rank n ∈N.
One form of logical learning is to learn that, contrary to what the ideal doxastic
agent had thought initially, some hypothesis H logically implies some evidence
E. This amounts to learning that H∧¬E is not logically possible after all, and can
be thought of as learning with certainty that ¬H ∨ E. Logical learning of this sort
corresponds to an implosion of the ideal doxastic agent’s algebra of propositions.
Another form of logical learning is to learn that, contrary to what she had thought
initially, H does not logically imply E. This amounts to learning that H ∧ ¬E is
logically possible after all. It corresponds to an explosion of the ideal doxastic
agent’s algebra of propositions. Mixed changes of explosions and implosions can
be dealt with in a stepwise fashion, as the order does not matter.
So far I have assumed the sets of possible worlds W to be given, and the notion
of refinement, or specificity, to be a primitive4. To deal with logical learning in a
bit more detail I will now present one way to think of them. A formal language
is generally defined recursively as follows. We start with a set of propositional
letters
{
p, q, r, . . .
}
and say that each of them is a sentence. Then we say that ¬A,
A∧B, A∨B, and A ⊃ B are sentences, if A and B are. Finally we add that nothing
else is a sentence. This is how we obtain a formal language or set of sentences L.
In the case of a predicate or modal language things are slightly more complicated,
but otherwise proceed in the same way.
The powerset of such a formal language, ℘ (L), is one way to generate a set
of possible worlds. A sentence A from L is said to be true in a possible world
w ∈ ℘ (L) just in case A ∈ w. One possible world w is a refinement of another
possible world w′ just in case w ⊆ w′. Among these possible worlds there are, of
4The latter can take several forms, e.g. by using Cartesian products of sets of possibilities.
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course, many that are contradictory in the sense that the rules of inference for the
language L – classical, as I will assume below, or non-classical – disprove them.
But this is logical knowledge the ideal doxastic agent may not yet possess. All
possible worlds w that have non-contradictory refinements other than themselves
are redundant or non-maximal, but this is again logical knowledge the ideal dox-
astic agent may not yet posses. An ideal doxastic agent is logically omniscient
only if she has eliminated all possible worlds except those that are maximal and
non-contradictory. If the ideal doxastic agent comes across a new word, she just
throws it into her bag of propositional letters or predicates and lets the recursive
machinery sketched above generate a new language containing the old one. Con-
ceptual conditionalization does the rest.
To illustrate suppose the set of propositional variables is
{
p, q
}
which generates
the formal language L, and Sophia initially has no logical knowledge. Then her
set of possible worlds is ℘ (L). Sophia takes a course in propositional logic and
learns with certainty that p logically implies p ∨ q. Then Sophia eliminates all
sets of sentences w ∈ ℘ (L) that contain p, but that do not contain p ∨ q. Next
Sophia learns with certainty that the rules of inference for L disprove the schema
A ∧ ¬A. Then she eliminates all sets of sentences that contain any sentence of
the form A ∧ ¬A. In the third weak Sophia learns, again with certainty, that the
set of sentences
{
p, q
}
disproves ¬ (p ∧ q). How she learns this piece of logical
knowledge depends on the way her instructor sets things up: one way of disprov-
ing works by showing that
{
p, q
}∪{¬ (p ∧ q)} proves p∧¬p, which Sophia already
knows to be disprovable (from the empty set). Another way of disproving works
by showing that
{
p, q
}
logically implies p ∧ q. In this latter case Sophia does not
only learn that all sets of sentences including both p and q, but excluding p ∧ q,
are redundant or inconsistent, but also that all sets of sentences including p and
q and ¬ (p ∧ q) are inconsistent. All these changes correspond to implosions. If
Sophia does not learn with certainty, then the parameter ∞ has to be lowered to
some finite number.
Finally, if Sophia initially thinks that q and p ⊃ q logically implies p, then her
set of possibilities W excludes all sets of sentences containing both q and p ⊃ q,
but not p. If Sophia then learns that she was mistaken about this alleged logical
implication, she expands W by adding all these sets of sentences. Some of these
newly added ones will be refinements of sets of sentences Sophia already deemed
possible initially. Sophia’s ranks for the latter determine her ranks for the former.
All the others of these newly added sets of sentences receive rank 0.
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4 Conditional information
It’s Sophia’s birthday and her friend Bay treats Sophia to a nice bottle of red or
white wine. The bottle of wine is wrapped in paper, and Sophia is curious to learn
if it is a bottle of barrique or not. Bay tells Sophia: it is a barrique, given that it is
a bottle of red wine. Sophia deems Bay reliable to a very high, but finite, grade n.
How should Sophia revise her beliefs and conditional beliefs in response to this
piece of conditional information? The answer is given by
Update Rule 5 (Conditional Conditionalization) If % (·) : A → N ∪ {∞} is
the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′ her
conditional rank for A given C improves by n ∈N, and her ranks are not directly
affected in any other way such as forgetting etc., then her ranking function at time
t′ should be %(A|C)↑n (·) : A → N ∪ {∞}, which results from % by n consecutive
Shenoy shifts on the evidential partition{
A ∩ C,A ∩ C,A ∩ C,A ∩ C
}
with input parameters
zA∩C = 0, zA∩C = x, zA∩C = 1, zA∩C = x,
where x = 1 if % (A ∩ C) > %
(
A ∩ C
)
, and x = 0 otherwise.
This looks awfully complicated, but that is because of a technical detail. The
idea itself is very simple: we improve the rank of A ∩ C compared to the rank of
A ∩ C. This can happen in more than one way, though: by decreasing the rank of
A ∩ C and by holding fixed the rank of the other three cells of the partition, or by
increasing the rank of A∩C and by holding fixed the rank of the other three cells
of the partition. Which of these two ways of improving should happen depends
on the ideal doxastic agent’s initial beliefs. In many cases one first has to start
improving in the first manner and then, mid-way, switch to the second manner of
improving. This is why I have chosen to formulate the update rule in terms of
n consecutive Shenoy shifts, which makes it look complicated. I will present a
different, and perhaps more perspicuous, formulation below.
A is a proposition in Sophia’s algebra, and so is the condition C. However, the
conditional information A given C is not itself a proposition. If it were, we would
use plain, Spohn, or Shenoy conditionalization. To stress that we are dealing with
a conditional belief in A given C rather than the belief in a conditional propo-
sition “If A, then C” I continue to use ‘A’ for the target proposition, and I use
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‘C’ for the condition (and not for the antecedent and consequent of a conditional
proposition).
Receiving the conditional information that it is a barrique given that it is red
wine from her friend Bay, who Sophia deems reliable to grade n, tells Sophia
to improve her rank for the proposition that it is a red barrique compared to her
rank for the proposition that it is a red non-barrique by n ranks. Everything else
depends on Sophia’s initial grading of disbelief R.
Suppose Sophia initially has no clue about what wine Bay will bring, except
that it is red wine or white wine and that it might be a barrique or not:
R ({red & barrique}) = 0
R ({red &¬ barrique}) = 0
R ({white & barrique}) = 0
R ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
Then Sophia’s new grading of disbelief R∗ is such that she holds the conditional
belief that it is a barrique given that it is red wine, but she continues to suspend
judgment with respect to whether it is red wine or white wine, and whether it is
a barrique or not. The only contingent belief Sophia holds is that it is not a red
non-barrique:
R∗ ({red & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({red &¬ barrique}) = n
R∗ ({white & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
Suppose next that Sophia initially believes that Bay will bring red wine, but she
suspends judgment with respect to whether it is a barrique or not. She also believes
that it is a barrique given that it is white wine.
R ({red & barrique}) = 0
R ({red &¬ barrique}) = 0
R ({white & barrique}) = 7
R ({white &¬ barrique}) = 11
Then Sophia’s new grading of disbelief R∗ is such that she holds the conditional
belief that it is a barrique given that it is red wine. In addition Sophia continues to
12
believe that it is red wine, but now also believes that it is a barrique. Sophia also
continues to believe that it is a barrique given that it is white wine.
R∗ ({red & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({red &¬ barrique}) = n
R∗ ({white & barrique}) = 7
R∗ ({white &¬ barrique}) = 11
Now suppose Sophia initially believes that Bay will bring white wine, but she
suspends judgment with respect to whether it is a barrique or not. Initially Sophia
also holds the conditional belief that it is a non-barrique given that it is red wine.
R ({red & barrique}) = 9
R ({red &¬ barrique}) = 7
R ({white & barrique}) = 0
R ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
If n > 2 so that Sophia deems Bay more reliable than the strength with which
she holds her conditional belief, then Sophia’s new grading of disbelief R∗ will
be such that she holds the opposite conditional belief that it is a barrique given
that it is red wine. If n ≥ 9 Sophia even gives up her belief that it is white wine,
although she won’t believe that it is red wine. In either case she continues to
suspend judgment with respect to whether it is a barrique or not, unconditionally
as well as conditional on it being white wine.
R∗ ({red & barrique}) = 9 − x where x = min {n, 9}
R∗ ({red &¬ barrique}) = 7 +max {n − x, 0}
R∗ ({white & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
This time suppose Sophia initially already believes that Bay will bring a barrique,
unconditionally and conditional on it being red wine and conditional on it being
white wine, but suspends judgment with respect to whether it is red wine or white
wine. In addition Sophia holds the conditional belief that it is red wine given that
it is a non-barrique.
R ({red & barrique}) = 0
R ({red &¬ barrique}) = 5
R ({white & barrique}) = 0
R ({white &¬ barrique}) = 7
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Then Sophia’s new grading of disbelief R∗ is such that she continues to hold the
belief that it is a barrique, and the conditional belief that it is a barrique given that
it is red wine, and the conditional belief that it is a barrique given that it is white
wine. In addition she continues to suspend judgment with respect to whether it
is red or white wine. Depending on how reliable Sophia deems Bay to be she
may give up her initial belief that it is red wine given that it is a non-barrique
(n ≥ 2), and she may even adopt the belief that it is white wine given that it is a
non-barrique (n > 2).
R∗ ({red & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({red &¬ barrique}) = 5 + n
R∗ ({white & barrique}) = 0
R∗ ({white &¬ barrique}) = 7
Yet another possibility is that Sophia initially believes that Bay will bring a non-
barrique, unconditionally and conditional on it being white wine and conditional
on it being red wine, but she suspends judgment with respect to whether it is red or
white wine, unconditionally and conditional on it being a barrique and conditional
on it being a non-barrique.
R ({red & barrique}) = 5
R ({red &¬ barrique}) = 0
R ({white & barrique}) = 5
R ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
If Sophia deems Bay sufficiently reliable for her to give up the conditional belief
that it is a non-barrique given that it is red wine (n ≥ 5), then Sophia continues to
suspend judgment with respect to whether it is red or white wine. If 0 < n < 5 so
that Sophia holds her initial beliefs more firmly than she deems Bay reliable, but
she still deems Bay reliable to some degree, then she adopts the belief that it is red
wine given that it is a barrique, but continues to suspend judgment with respect to
whether it is red or white wine given that it is a non-barrique. In all these cases
Sophia retains her belief that it is a non-barrique given that it is white wine.
R∗ ({red & barrique}) = 5 − x where x = min {n, 5}
R∗ ({red &¬ barrique}) = 0 +max {n − x, 0}
R∗ ({white & barrique}) = 5
R∗ ({white &¬ barrique}) = 0
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We thus see that it is difficult to say what happens to the ideal doxastic agent’s
beliefs and conditional beliefs when she receives conditional information such
as an indicative conditional that does not express a proposition. It is difficult to
say in the precise sense that there is not a single contingent proposition that she is
guaranteed to believe after the update. Nor is there a single contingent proposition
that she is guaranteed to conditionally believe after the update. This includes the
very piece of conditional information that the ideal doxastic agent learns, as she
may deem the source of information somewhat, but insufficiently reliable.
If R disbelieves A given C, then the rank of A∩C is lowered and the remaining
three cells are held fixed until R does not disbelieve A given C anymore. At this
point the parameter x in conditional conditionalization changes to from x = 1 to
x = 0. If R does not disbelieve A given C, then the cell A ∩ C is moved upwards
and the remaining three cells are held fixed. If R initially disbelieves the condition
C, then she gives up her disbelief in C only if she gives up her disbelief in what
the source claims was the wrong thing to disbelieve: A ∩ C. If R initially does
not disbelieve the condition C, then R continues to do so. However, the reason
for doing so may change. Initially it may be because R assigns rank 0 to what the
source claims is the wrong thing to not disbelieve: A ∩ C. In the new grading of
disbelief R∗ it may be because A ∩ C, but not A ∩ C, receives rank 0.
What can be said in general is relative to the ideal doxastic agent’s initial grad-
ing of disbelief R. Receiving the conditional information that A given C from a
source she deems reliable to grade n improves the rank of A by n compared to
the rank of A within the condition C, but not within the condition C. Within the
latter condition everything is kept as it was initially. In other words, conditional
conditionalization transforms a given grading of disbelief R into a new grading
of disbelief R∗ such that: R∗
(
A | C
)
− R∗ (A | C) = R
(
A | C
)
− R (A | C) + n.
Furthermore, conditional conditionalization is purely conditional in the sense that
R∗
(
· | C
)
= R
(
· | C
)
and R∗
(
C
)
= R
(
C
)
. The latter feature uniquely charac-
terizes conditional conditionalization among all consecutive Shenoy-shifts on the
evidential partition
{
A ∩ C,A ∩ C,A ∩ C,A ∩ C
}
that possess the former feature.
It is important to note that the rank of the condition C may increase or decrease,
whereas the rank of the proposition A can decrease, but cannot increase, and the
rank of its negation A can increase, but cannot decrease.
The feature that the rank of the condition C may increase or decrease dis-
tinguishes conditional conditionalization from Bradley (2005)’s “Adams condi-
tionalization.” The latter transforms a given probability measure Pr into a new
probability measure Pr∗ in response to input of the form Pr∗ (A | C) = p such that:
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P1 Pr∗ (· | A ∩ C) = Pr (· | A ∩ C)
P2 Pr∗
(
· | A ∩ C
)
= Pr
(
· | A ∩ C
)
P3 Pr∗
(
· | C
)
= Pr
(
· | C
)
P4 Pr∗
(
C
)
= Pr
(
C
)
Bradley (2005) shows that these four conditions and input of the form Pr∗ (A | C) =
p transform a given old Pr into a unique new Pr∗. In the exact same way R(A|C)↑n =
R∗ is determined uniquely by input of the form R∗
(
A | C
)
− R∗ (A | C) = n and
the following four conditions:
R1 R∗ (· | A ∩ C) = R (· | A ∩ C)
R2 R∗
(
· | A ∩ C
)
= R
(
· | A ∩ C
)
R3 R∗
(
· | C
)
= R
(
· | C
)
R4 R∗
(
C
)
= R
(
C
)
However, in the probabilistic case the condition P4 implies that Pr∗ (C) = Pr (C),
and hence that Adams conditionalization can never change the probability of the
condition C. Douven & Romeijn (2011) conclude that this very feature prevents
Adams conditioning from being an adequate rule to respond to new information
of conditional form. Douven (2012) and Hartmann & Rad (ms) then propose to
remedy this situation by making external information available to the ideal doxas-
tic agent – such as information about explanatory relationships (Douven 2012), or
information about independence relationships that are suggested by some causal
structure (Hartmann & Rad ms). In doing so these authors go beyond the re-
sources provided by the probability calculus, and thus abandon the Bayesian idea
that the probability calculus is all there is to scientific reasoning. In the present
framework of ranking functions no such maneuvers are necessary: the rank of the
condition C is not determined by the rank of its complement C, and can go up or
down or stay the same, depending on the conditional information received and the
initial grading of disbelief.
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